Congressional earmarks have been the subject of significant political debate in recent years. Also known as "pork barrel spending," earmarks are budgetary requests made by a single legislator that typically circumvent the traditional competitive bidding process designed to ensure the efficient use of public dollars. Utilizing annual state-level estimates of pork barrel spending, we briefly examine the factors influencing states' receipt of earmarked funds from Congress. Results indicate that on average smaller states receive the largest amount of per capita earmarked funding, most likely as a result of their disproportionate influence in the Senate. In addition, the presence of a Republican Congressional delegation increases pork spending in the state. Finally, the tenure of a state's senior Senator has a large effect on the state's receipt of earmarked funds. Each additional year of Senate experience by a state's senior Senator results in a $4.48 increase in earmarked dollars per capita for that state's residents.
Introduction
The reduction of government waste and fraud is a top goal of political reformers. One particular form of government waste that has become the subject of significant debate over the past several years is the technique known as "earmarking." Earmarks are budgetary requests made by a single legislator that typically direct spending towards his or her own constituents.
Earmarks generally circumvent the traditional competitive bidding process or other controls designed to ensure that government spending meets efficiency standards. Earmarks are also commonly known as "pork barrel spending," or more simply as "pork" and the terms will be used interchangeably in this paper. The problems of earmarking are exemplified by the infamous "bridge to nowhere." In 2005, Alaska Senator Ted Stevens earmarked funds to build a bridge between the small town of Ketchikan and nearby Gravina Island at a cost to taxpayers of $320 million, or roughly $40,000 per resident of Ketchikan.
The elimination of wasteful government spending is often a hallmark of political campaigns. For example, 2008 Republican Presidential nominee John McCain estimated that "the savings from eliminating earmarks, reviewing federal programs and other budget reforms would be 'on the order of $100 billion annually,'" an amount that would fund a significant portion of the tax cuts proposed by the candidate (Cooper, 2008 Bernhardt, et al. (2004) theorize that incumbent politicians with seniority will be able to direct larger funding to their districts and use this notion to argue in favor of term limits for legislators. vote was 5% or less; z ti is a vector of dummy variables for the 7 years of observations in the dataset and for the 9 census regions; γ is a constant, and ε ti is a random error term.
Data and Model

Results
As shown in Table 2 , small states (in terms of population) earn a disproportionately large share of Congressional earmarks. As noted by Hauk and Wacziarg (2007) 
Conclusions
The earmarking process, through which House and Senate members can circumvent the standard federal budgeting process, provides an easy avenue through which funds can be allocated to a lawmaker's home district. Our analysis of Congressional earmarks from 2000-2006 finds that on average smaller states receive the largest amount of per capita earmarked funding, most likely as a result of their disproportionate influence in the Senate. In addition, the presence of a Republican Congressional delegation, the party in power over the time period of the study, increases pork spending in the state. Finally, the tenure of a state's senior Senator has a large effect on the state's receipt of earmarked funds.
Reform of the earmarking system is a difficult problem to tackle, as the defeat of the proposed earmark moratorium in early 2008 attests. Legislators wield their influence earned through seniority and party control to direct federal spending to their constituents. This cozy arrangement benefits residents of states with low populations and senior politicians, and these voters reciprocate by reelecting incumbents by wide margins. This arrangement does little, however, to ensure the efficiency of government spending. Indeed, the Gravina Island bridge is unlikely to be the last "bridge to nowhere." 
